Brazil and the USA live their most complicated moment in diplomatic relations since they began 201 years ago. Donald Trump’s government poses demands that are virtually impossible to answer. The way out is damage prevention, and, simultaneously, seeking new opportunities.

The assessment is by Bruna Santos, director of the Brazil program in the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, based in Washington.

“I see no short-term solution to this political crisis. President Trump’s request for the Brazilian government is, in practice, unfeasible, and has left the country with no space to maneuver”, says Santos, in reference to Trump’s demand that Brazil cease to sue ex-president Jair Bolsonaro.

“It falls to the Brazilian private sector to keep dialogue with their equivalent in the US, making sure that the data and facts of our commercial relationship circulate, are understood, and stop a process of decoupling between the two economies. It is the layer that sustains the economic dividends of the relationship while politics rebuilds itself”, affirms.

The program in Brazil in the Inter-American Dialogue was officially launched last Wednesday, the 17th, following the reclaiming of the Brazil Institute, previously based in the Wilson Center.

“This transition happened after a decision by the North American government to end activities in the Wilson Center, a step which had big repercussions in the field of foreign politics in Washington”, says Bruna. Today, we are the only public politics program in Washington fully dedicated to Brazil and its relationship with the US”.

In a talk with EXAME, she comments on the outlook for the UN General Assembly, due to begin on Tuesday, the 23^rd, and on how Brazil is currently seen in Washington. Read below.

What are some possible ways out of the current crisis between Brazil and the US?

I usually consider three levels—first, the vortex of political crisis. Here, I see no short-term solution. President Trump’s request to the Brazilian government is, in practice, unfeasible and has left the country with no room to maneuver.

Second, damage prevention. This is the most immediate space for action: It falls to the Brazilian private sector to keep dialogue with their equivalent in the US, making sure that the data and facts of our commercial relationship circulate, are understood, and stop a process of decoupling between the two economies. It is the layer that sustains the economic dividends of the relationship while politics rebuilds itself.

Third, opportunities. I try to see this crisis as an opportunity to face complex themes we’ve been postponing: the cost of fragmenting global chains, the risks of an even bigger closing of the economies, and the importance of countries that don’t want to be dragged into the US-China dispute, building bridges, offering regular pluralism, and adding complexity to the international system.

How to manage damages and seek opportunities in this context?

Brazil needs to keep seeking continuous dialogue, reframe the narrative, and bet on practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest. This will be the path further to rebuild the political relationship on more solid foundations. Many times, a bilateral relationship is seen only through the lens of disputes and tensions. But there is a very solid economic interdependency that must be better communicated. Brazilian investment generates employment and growth in many American regions, such as the case of Suzano in Arkansas, while American companies rely on Brazil in strategic supply chains. These are concrete stories that connect this partnership directly to jobs, communities, and consumers.

On the Brazilian side, it is also essential to send clear signals of disposition to better the relationship, show democratic resilience, and adopt a proactive diplomatic stance. This helps to reduce uncertainties and amplifies the space for commercial and political bargaining.

Another critical point is to increase Washington’s understanding. Today, there are very few voices in the North American executive sector that truly know Brazil. Our job seeks to fill this gap, bringing in data, analyses, and concrete examples of cooperation that aim for the long run. Ultimately, I envision significant opportunities for collaboration in strategic sectors – from sustainable farming and aviation fuels to renewable energy, critical minerals, AI, and biotech. The strategy is to start with traditional stories of commerce and investment, which generate trust, and from there open the way to more complex and sensitive topics.

In the next few days, Lula and Trump will be in New York for the UN General Assembly. Do you see a possibility for the event to bring them somehow closer?

Very close to zero. The UN General Assembly, for President Lula, is a space for affirming Brazil's role in the defense of a multipolar order and in the strengthening of multilateral institutions, objectives that sharply oppose those of President Trump. I don’t see any margin for the event to bring them together.

The Trump government has adopted a very harsh stance against Brazil. Do you see any space for a change of stance without Brazil succumbing to the demands of removing the lawsuits against Bolsonaro?

In the short term, the US political stance in relation to Brazil tends to remain as it is. The upcoming elections in Brazil can alter the political scenery and create new possibilities. But it is important to remember that the opening and closing of new opportunities for economic bargaining also depend on this political context. At the same time, simply waiting won’t do. The Brazilian economic sectors must act now, securing presence, dialogue, and seats at the negotiation tables. This proactivity is essential so that, regardless of the political context, Brazil is well poised to defend its interests and build bridges.

How far can the punishments of the Trump administration reach? New tariffs and sections to the authorities are likely options, but are there other possibilities?

Predictability has not been a defining aspect of Washington in these last few months. So far, everything discussed remains in the realm of speculation. The command chains are diffused, and decision-making has changed much in this new Trump administration. Among the likely possibilities, in decreasing order of likelihood, I would highlight: amplification of the Magnitsky sanctions to include more judges and even their families; the extension of these sanctions to authorities of the executive power; the imposing of across the board tariffs, justified by Brazilian exports of Russian oil based products; and, lastly, the withdrawal of some of the exemptions discussed in the first round of the tariffs – many of which were earned by the directly affected American economic sectors.

How do you see the current image of Brazil in Washington?

Brazil’s image in Washington today is a challenging one. During the Trump administration, there was a deterioration in the perception and a reduction in understanding of the country. This is due to a combination of factors: less attention is dedicated to Brazil in American foreign policy, the lack of executives with in-depth knowledge of the country, and tensions related to both the commercial agenda and preoccupations with Brazilian democracy and the judicial system. This is added to a perceived Brazilian alignment with strategic enemies of the US, such as China and even Russia.

Can democrats be more incisive to try and bar measures against Brazil?

In the American Congress, there is a core of politicians more engaged with Brazil, especially in the Brazil Caucus. Beyond this group, however, knowledge is limited. Democrats have other priorities now and have been betting more on Trump’s popularity decline to reap victories in the midterms. Brazil is seen with sympathy in many circles, but not as a priority. Besides, there are objective limits to what a minority in Congress can do. So far, actions by the Democrats have been purely symbolic, part of a political game, but with minimal practical effect to bar harsh measures against Brazil.

What really makes a difference is a clear disposition signaled by Brazil to improve relations and sustain cooperation in areas of mutual interest. It is also crucial that Brazilian economic sectors don’t keep waiting for politics: they must ensure their presence, dialogue, and representation at the negotiation tables in Washington.

What are the main objectives of Brazil’s program in the Inter-American Dialogue?

The creation of the Brazil Program in the Inter-American Dialogue was the result of the migration of the Brazil Institute, previously hosted in the Wilson Center. This transition occurred after the North American government decided to end activities at the Wilson Center. This measure has had significant repercussions in the field of foreign politics in Washington. Today, we are the only program of public politics in Washington entirely dedicated to Brazil and US-Brazil relations. Our contribution comes from having this unique presence in the American capital, elevating and qualifying debates that matter, and intense networking, reuniting leaders of many sectors and political orientations to transform dialogue into impact.

Our objective is to offer independent research, dialogue, and political engagement about Brazil and its relationship with the developments in the United States and other parts of the world. We seek to fit the narrative objectively, highlighting not only the tensions but also concrete examples of economic cooperation and mutual benefits in areas such as commerce, investment, technology, and the environment. Many times, we explain Brazil to the decision makers here.